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Abstract
This article draws from the authors’ experiences of research in England on aspects of
New Labour’s reforms in the field of child protection to counsel caution against
standardisation processes currently underway in the Republic of Ireland. It is argued
that such processes are deeply problematic when dealing with the complexity of child
protection work. Alternatives to standardisation are offered drawing from the literature
on systems design. Such alternatives are likely to build confidence and trust in services.
Keywords: child protection, standardisation, system design.
Introduction
The title of this paper reworks the old nationalist dictum ‘England’s difficulty is
Ireland’s opportunity’ to argue that there is an opportunity for Ireland to learn from
England’s recent difficulties in child protection and to apply these lessons to proposed
reforms of children’s services. Our particular interest in this paper is the implementation
of a standardised business process project to ensure uniform recording and assessment
processes (PA Consulting Group, 2009; Health Service Executive, 2009).
We explore the paradox that, at a time where developments such as standardisation are
under serious scrutiny in England, they are being embraced in Ireland. We explore the
similarities and differences between what is underway in Ireland and developments in
England. We argue for, and offer suggestions towards, finding a way through which may
help avoid the pitfalls of either a standardisation agenda or unfettered diversity resulting
in a post code lottery.
England: new public management, ‘deliverology’ and child protection
A series of developments in England under New Labour led to a highly centralised
‘command and control’ approach to regulating the activities of social workers in the
area of child protection. Alongside a reformulation of the role of the welfare state, there
was also a continuation from the Conservatives of what became known as ‘the
managerial partnership state’ (Featherstone, 2004). Although there were differences
from the foregoing neoconservative agenda, New Labour’s infatuation with the methods
of private business was, if anything, stronger. Enabling, brokerage and regulating were
emphasised over providing, and where the state did provide this was both targeted and
subject to target setting.
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New Labour’s approach to public administration provided the perfect medium for socalled new public management (NPM) to flourish (Dillow, 2007). Its ideological
contours are that: a central elite know best; strong top-down management is the key to
quality and performance; workers are self-interested and inefficient; the standardisation
of processes and explicit targets drive quality and these are ensured by rigorous micromanagement using performance indicators (Chard and Ayre, 2010). In the context of
human services and particularly child protection, NPM has been centrally concerned
with managing institutional risk (Munro, 2009), creating a climate of ‘targets and terror’
(Bevan and Hood, 2006).
It is impossible to understand the genesis of the reforms to child welfare in England
without understanding the key policy mantras as outlined above. Moreover, they are
proving very difficult to destabilise, despite a range of compelling critiques.
Transforming children’s services post Climbié
The reform of children’s services was accelerated in 2000 with the death of Victoria
Climbié (Laming, 2003), but as we shall see from its unmistakable family resemblances,
its progenitors are NPM and performance management. Victoria died in London as a
result of long-standing cruelty at the hands of her great aunt and her partner. Her death
prompted a highly influential inquiry into professional and institutional failure. As a
result, government put in place a series of reforms drawing heavily upon concepts of
‘business process management’, electronically enacted through the Integrated
Children’s System (ICS) (Shaw et al., 2009; White et al., 2010). The ICS attempts to
micro-manage practice through the imposition of a detailed, work-flow model of the
case management process and other processes, as figure 1 demonstrates.
Many of Laming’s broad diagnostics of the failures contributing to Victoria’s death are
accurate enough. However, his relative neglect of human, interactional and social
factors means that the policy responses, particularly the standardised processes and
‘information sharing’ initiatives, have been based on a set of erroneous assumptions.
The most notable of these is that catastrophic child deaths are substantially the result of
professionals failing to record or share information. Such failures are not trivial, but in
our view rarely are they causal. Rather, they are ubiquitous features of many cases
which do not end catastrophically, as Wastell notes:
[T]o be sure that this evidence is decisive, we need to know how often it was
present in other cases but did not lead to calamity. ... Unless it can be shown …
that assessments, information gathering and multi-agency collaboration were
conspicuously worse in the serious cases, how can it possibly be claimed that
these were critical causal features? (Wastell, 2011).
For the causal factors in the death of Victoria, we need to look elsewhere. A reexamination of some of the evidence submitted to the Climbié inquiry will illustrate our
point.
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Figure 1: Referral and assessment process as officially charted in the ICS. The diagram
is adapted from the Children’s Social Care Services Core Information Requirements
Process Model (DCSF, August 2008). The diagram covers the first quarter of the
process model for “Core case management operations”. It is one of 11 such models!
Human factors in child protection: The Laming Inquiry revisited
In July 1999 Dr Schwartz, consultant paediatrician at Central Middlesex hospital,
examined lesions on Victoria’s body. Her clinical opinion was that the marks were selfinflicted due to intense itching from a scabies infection. This opinion differed from a
previously expressed and documented diagnosis by a locum registrar, who produced
detailed body maps of Victoria’s injuries and was of the view that there was a strong
possibility that she had been physically abused. Whilst Dr Schwartz testified to the
inquiry that she had made it clear to social services that she could not exclude physical
abuse, the production of a medical explanation for some of the injuries proved a highly
consequential red herring. The contact with social services to inform them of the
‘change’ of diagnosis was made by Dr Dempster, a junior doctor unfamiliar with social
services and the child protection system.
Dr Dempster followed up several unsatisfactory conversations with social workers with
the following letter:
“Thank you for dealing with the social issues of [Victoria]. She was admitted to
the ward last night with concerns re: possible NAI [non-accidental injuries]. She
has however been assessed by the consultant Dr Schwartz and it has been
decided that her scratch marks are all due to scabies. Thus it is no longer a child
protection issue.
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There are however several issues that need to be sorted out urgently:
1) [Victoria] and her mother are homeless. They moved out of their B & B
accommodation 3 days ago. 2) [Victoria] does not attend school. [Victoria]
and her mother recently arrived from France and do not have social network
in this country. Thank you for your help” (cited in Laming 2003, p. 251).
The letter’s communicative intent was to prompt a visit to the hospital by a social
worker, but was read by social services as a recategorization of the case, triggering a
quite different organizational response. Brent children’s services had two initial
assessment teams: referrals were considered first by the duty team, and if the referral
appeared to relate to ‘a child in need’, the case would remain with them for initial
assessment; if there were child protection concerns, it would be transferred to the child
protection team for urgent action. Under the Children Act, 1989 and the associated
guidance, the category of child in need was introduced to signal the importance of
offering support to families with a range of needs such as housing. This was intended to
ensure that local authorities did not just focus narrowly on immediate harms. Thus,
within the assumptive world of Brent Social Services, the crucial line of this letter
becomes ‘Thus it is no longer a child protection issue’ and not the documented ‘urgent’
social matters. The case thus entered a bottle neck in an over-stretched duty team,
dealing with backlog of 200-300 cases a week. Whilst these circumstances are clear,
such formal organizational systems escaped Laming’s criticism, indeed he prescribes
more of them (White, 2009a).
If we examine the events at Central Middlesex from the point of view of the human
actors, it is clear that complexities arise from the need to pass what might be speculative
and ambiguous information across service boundaries. Communications within a system
are embedded in a range of interpretive dichotomies: signal/non signal;
information/noise and pattern/randomness (Serres, 2007). One reader/hearer may find
information, where another detects only noise. For the receivers of the referrals, the
categories ‘non accidental injury’ or ‘child protection case’ were the signal, the genuine
deliberations of the doctors simply noise. There were plenty of instances of information
sharing in the Climbié case, but signal and noise were frequently confused.
Research shows that knowledge sharing is influenced by multiple interpersonal, social
and organisational factors, including the inhibitory impact of disparate knowledge
domains, social hierarchy and low trust (e.g. Cross and Borgatti, 2004). Information
throughout child welfare is thus ‘slippery’ (difficult to codify) and ‘sticky’ (difficult to
share across boundaries). The problem is not readily responsive to exhortations to ‘share
information’ (Swan and Scarbrough, 2001; Reder and Duncan, 2003). Yet, this is
exactly what Laming prescribes. The system wasn’t working to support safe practice,
yet the prescription was a stronger dose of the same medicine – a rigid workflow,
cumbrous forms and centrally imposed timescales.
The death of (Baby) Peter Connolly in 2007, and the media attention it attracted, opened
the Laming reforms to renewed scrutiny. Peter was a 17 month infant, subject to a child
protection plan, supervised, like the Climbié case, by the London Borough of Haringey.
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Both the hospital and the social work staff were too willing to believe the
plausible accounts the mother was offering to explain child A’s injuries. In the
more holistic context of the case the explanations offered by Ms A should have
been questioned (Department for Education, 2010).
The quotation above is taken from the Serious Case Review (SCR) into Peter’s death.
Throughout extensive professional involvement, Peter continued to sustain multiple
injuries, as the SCR panel reports above. His death took place years after the
implementation of the Laming reforms, which were to ensure that ‘this could never
happen again’.
So, how could it happen again? How can apparently reasonable and motivated staff
make repeated errors in the attribution of cause and effect and fail to see what was
happening right under their noses? An examination of the literature on human factors in
decision-making shows this to be not very surprising at all, the post Laming reforms
simply failed to take proper account of these factors. The intrinsic characteristics of
information processing by human beings operate as both friend and foe in social work
decision-making. At an individual level, we are equipped with an innate apparatus to
assess our fellow human beings on an intuitive/emotional level, and alongside this we
have particular cognitive biases. The generation of hypotheses is affected by our
cognitive capacities in two principal ways: it is limited by what is available in memory,
and by ‘psychological commitment’ to the first hypothesis. This is confounded by the
related tendency to seek out evidence that confirms a hypothesis, rather than searching
for ‘disconfirming’ evidence (Wolf et al., 1985). Thus, once we have settled on an
interpretation of events we tend to deviate little from our initial ‘anchor’ hypothesis
(Kahneman et al., 1982). In Peter’s case the fallacious formulation was the result of
professionals’ belief in his mother’s account of his behavioural difficulties, including
‘head banging’, which was also observed by professionals - ‘confirmation bias’ in
action.
When we add to the equation the social psychological and sociological dimensions,
which generate powerfully normative cultural practices, we have a heady cocktail
indeed (Haidt, 2001; White 2009b). It is clear that the failures in the case of Peter
Connelly were not in sharing or recording information, but in having the time, space,
argumentative flexibility, analytic ability and trusting relationships to debate and make
sense of what was being seen and recorded. If we want safer child protection systems
we are going to have to design them for the right species.
In England, the policies implemented under New Labour were to result in a ‘perfect
storm’: timescales, targets and the Integrated Children’s System (ICS). It became
apparent that a key casualty of these ‘reforms’ was time spent with families. The audit
tail was well and truly wagging the practice dog. Rather than protecting against system
failure, these factors exacerbated ‘latent conditions for error’ (Reason, 2000) because
they made the work bureaucratically complicated whilst failing to take account of its
human complexity.
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The English system reassessed
The ICS, with its form-based artefacts and rigid processes, was marked out for the
urgent attention of a national ‘Social Work Task Force’, set up by the Labour
government following the media furore evoked by the Peter Connelly case. Immediate
relaxation of its strictures was recommended (Social Work Task Force, 2009).
Further scrutiny of the system followed the general election in 2010 with establishment
of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Professor Eileen Munro was
commissioned to scrutinise and advise on reducing bureaucratic burdens in children’s
services. She concluded:
... The demands of bureaucracy have reduced [social workers’] capacity to work
directly with children, young people and families. Services have become so
standardised that they do not provide the required range of responses to the
variety of need that is presented. This review recommends a radical reduction in
the amount of central prescription to help professionals move from a compliance
culture to a learning culture... (Munro 2011, pp. 6-7).
Munro recommends that services are redesigned using ‘socio-technical’ principles (see
below), with due attention to the role of professional judgement. These well-established
principles have been used to good effect in healthcare systems exemplified in the patient
safety movement (inter alia Dekker, 2007; National Patient Safety Agency, 2011).
In the next section, we will change lenses, taking a wider view of the problematics of
the attempts to standardise responses in England. We shall see that its failure was far
from singular or unpredictable. From the perspective of the research literature on
business process management (BPM), its vicissitudes were entirely foreseeable.
Horses for courses and the limits of the BPM paradigm
We have noted above that the failures of the English reforms were quite predictable.
BPM is not a magic bullet, indeed as many as 80% of BPM initiatives fail (Trkman,
2010). Moreover, the critical success factors have been well investigated and are ably
reviewed by Trkman (2010). The degree to which processes can be validly standardised
is one such factor, indeed it is decisive. Technologies for process management will only
be effective for standard, routine processes and it is vital to distinguish between these
and non-routine counterparts (Wastell, 2011); put simply, the message is ‘do not
standardise processes that cannot be standardised!’ Lillrank and Liukko (2004) neatly
capture this distinction in their “Quality Broom” metaphor (figure 2).

Ireland’s opportunity to learn from England’s difficulties? Auditing uncertainty in child protection

55

Figure 2: “Quality Broom” metaphor (Lillrank and Liukko, 2004)
Lillrank and Liukko argue that non-routine processes differ from standard routines “in
that input is vague and not readily classified into categories. ... Therefore the assessment
of an input is an interpretation which must be derived through the search for new
information, iterative reasoning, and trial-and-error” (ibid. p. 42). Whereas standard
processes can be managed directly through procedural or technological means, “nonroutine processes are best managed by indirect means, such as competence, professional
values, visions and missions” (ibid., p. 44). Through culture, in other words (Mannion et
al., 2009). Or as Weick (1987, p. 124) put it:
“Either culture or standard operating procedures can impose order ... but only
culture also adds in latitude for interpretation, improvisation, and unique action”
Much of the professional task of social work lies at the “brush” end of the quality
broom, which explains ‘in a sweep’ why process standardisation was always the wrong
approach.
Another way of characterising these crucial issues is the process/practice dichotomy
(Wastell, 2011). ‘Process’ can be defined as a formal set of sequential steps whereby
some output is produced, whereas ‘Practice’ refers to the activity of getting the work
done, the artful performance of a craft. In social work, the former may be recording a
contact with a service, the latter the work with the family and the sense-making
involved. Although written in relation to a different professional task, that of software
development, one of us argued some time ago that the belief that formalised processes
can magically substitute for skilled practice represents a form of fetish (Wastell, 1996).
Software engineering went through its standardisation ‘turn’ over a decade ago, and the
comparison with social work is instructive. Standard processes were introduced in the
form of “structured methodologies” (Wastell, 1999). The effort failed, making way for
the development of alternative approaches (agile methods) which gave full space for the
virtuosity and creativity of individuals, imposing only a minimum of structure. Social
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work in the UK is learning now, sadly the hard way, what software engineering learned
over a decade ago.
The argument encapsulated in the quality broom metaphor, is thus not for or against
standardisation, but for a recognition of the diversity within a system.
Managers need to decide what should be strictly regulated and what should be
left to empowered individuals and groups ... A great deal of trouble follows, if
processes are interpreted as being different from what on closer examination
they really are (Lillrank and Liukko, 2004, p. 45).
Taking these insights, what are we to make of the Irish reform programme? Has it been
designed after careful analysis of Irish social work’s ‘broom’? Does it take account of
human factors? Is it based on a thoroughgoing analysis of the causal factors in Ireland’s
high profile cases, or does it repeat the ‘strong but wrong’ assumptive base of the
English model?
What’s happening in Ireland?
Irish social work has seen a steady, incremental process that has broadly
followed and adopted the international trends and key themes in the quality
programme: raised scrutiny, procedural compliance, accountability (defined in
financial terms), practice standardisation, inspection, and, more recently, audit in
the form of compliance with agreed agency requirements’ ( Kemp, 2008, p.
101).
However, Kemp noted that while there were similarities with the UK, the scale and
scope of the quality programme at the time he was writing was far less intense and
focused. Moreover, he noted the interesting paradox that the more attempts were made
to standardise control, the more divergent practice appeared to become. For example,
the advent of Children First: National Guidelines for the Protection and Welfare of
Children (Department of Health and Children, 1999) was seen as a significant attempt
to standardise the way social workers worked, how and who they liaised with, and how
they accessed child welfare concerns. However, as soon as the document had been
launched, variations were adopted by each Health Board. Indeed, instead of
standardising practice, it merely led to greater degrees of divergence and localised
arrangements. This finding is important in understanding the latest attempts at
standardisation in Ireland (see PA Consulting, 2009).
However, as in the UK the catalyst for much of what has happened has been key
inquiry reports including The Report of the Kilkenny Incest Investigation (McGuinness,
1993), The Ferns Report (Murphy et al., 2005), Ryan Report, (2009) and the
Roscommon Child Care Case (2010). These raised public awareness, increased
demands for better protection and placed child protection social work under increased
scrutiny. This created a heightened focus on, and pre-occupation with, procedures
which sought standardised responses and individual social worker accountability.
The Irish Social Services Inspectorate and, more recently, the Health Information and
Quality Assurance agency (HIQA) have been promoting developments in relation to
audit, quality insurance, inspection, effectiveness and efficiency over the last decades.
Since 2005, Buckley (2008) notes there have been increasing manifestations of the New
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Public Management (NPM) approach. For example, there is increased attention to
performance indicators, with Section 8 reports identifying how many child protection
conferences were held where parents and children were invited, the numbers where they
attended, the number of reports received by category, the number of initial assessments
conducted, and the number of cases where initial assessment led to listing on the Child
Protection Notification System. However, as Buckley notes, there is no explanation of
what these indicators demonstrate. Furthermore, they contrast with the Analysis and
Commentary Sections of the Section 8 reports, which give a much fuller and more
complex picture of the varying meanings that can be attached to all these indicators.
At the time of writing the HSE is rolling out the National Child Care Information
System (NCCIS), which is to be implemented nationally in all Child and Family Social
Work departments (Health Service Executive, 2009). While the NCCIS encompasses all
areas of Child and Family services, the part of this new system which is of particular
concern is the Business Process Standardisation Project. It sets out a national standard
framework for recording and for monitoring how Child and Family Social Workers do
their work. The standard forms encompass every aspect of the work from referral, initial
assessment, further assessment, family support and children in care and must be filled
out within specified timescales. We would suggest there are obvious similarities with
the ICS work-flow mode.
But what problem is this focus on standardisation addressing in Ireland? If we explore,
for example, what happened in the Roscommon case (the most recent case to cause
concern) it is not clear at all that a focus on standardising processes is of value. In this
case of long-standing sexual abuse and neglect, what emerges is a complex and
interrelated constellation of issues involving cognitive ‘errors’, the conventions of
telling and the gendered nature of control issues in families. Categorisation of this case
as family support operated to locate interventions at the support end of the continuum
and this was exacerbated by the secretive nature of child sexual abuse and gendered
practices around control. As has been well documented, children who are being sexually
abused are seldom able to open up in any straightforward sense. Wattam (1999) has
argued for the importance of attending to the conventions of information exchange in
routine and non-routine encounters. Most people, children included, operate with a
hierarchy of who should be told what, and in what order. For example, where there is a
death in a family, there are usually conventions about who should be told first, and if
these are not adhered to, ill-feeling and distress may ensue. Research with children and
young people suggests they operate with a strong sense of who they want to tell what to,
and sexual abuse by parents can impact profoundly on their sense of what is the right
thing to do. For example, if a child is unable to tell their mother about a father’s abuse,
then it is unlikely that they will easily flout the convention (about who is first in line).
To put it bluntly, if those they want to trust with bad news cannot be told, then it is
possible they will tell no one at all. Therefore, in such cases standardised protocols that
emphasise social workers seeing and talking to the child are unlikely to be of value.
Overall, many of the most high profile scandals in Ireland have involved sexual abuse
either in families or in institutions. The Ryan Report (2009) offers a shocking
indictment of failures in relation to inspection and audit. However, these can only be
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understood within the culture of deference to the Catholic Church, and societal attitudes
to those who were poor and/or considered morally depraved.
Conflicts around care and control can characterise many cases where a range of abuses
are occurring and these are often gendered in nature. The father in the Roscommon case
was noted in the Inquiry Report to control interventions with workers and much practice
seemed to take place on his terms and his territory. The knowledge base in relation to
working with such men, and the dynamics of the relations they establish with women,
are poorly researched and understood and, indeed, we would argue constitute a serious
gap currently. It goes without saying that standardised protocols are of little value in
such situations as this is highly complex work (Featherstone, 2011). Moreover, there is
evidence to suggest that work with men is particularly prone to the kinds of cognitive
errors explored above, where they are categorised at an early point as a risk to the child
(or resource) with such categorisations becoming fixed and not open to revision.
A small scale consultation carried out by one of us with a team involved in
implementing the standardisation project in Ireland suggests that it does support
measures to improve audit. For example, it was easier for managers to see at a glance
how many referrals had come in and what had happened. Moreover, unlike the infamous
ICS system, the forms lent themselves to a narrative approach. However, even at such
an early stage of ‘roll out’ concerns were being expressed about the need to have
separate forms per child, and the apparent prescription in relation to the timing of caseconferences. The latter is not just of concern in terms of tempering professional
discretion in relation to when the conference might be most valuable, but such
conferences can be extremely intimidating events for parents and should arguably only
be held when it is clear that they will be of value, rather than to fit with a specific
timescale. A separate issue beyond the scope of this paper is that prescription in relation
to case-conferences could impact unhelpfully on whether more strengths-based
approaches such as Family Group Conferences are held.
Discussion and conclusion: There is an alternative
Social work is not unique as a professional activity, though it does have distinctive
aspects, and in looking for different ways of designing social care organisations, it
behoves managers and policy-makers to draw on the commodious literature on
organisational design. In these evidence-based times, managers must surely practise
what they preach for others.
de Sitter et al. (1997) identify mounting uncertainty and complexity as key challenges
for all organisations, for which two broad options are available. The first is to increase
internal complexity, through the creation of more staff functions and processes and,
therefore, more sophisticated management control structures. They dub this the strategy
of “complex organisations and simple jobs”. The second response takes the opposite
tack, reducing control and coordination by the creation of self-contained units.
Fragmented tasks are to be combined into larger wholes, thinking to be re-united with
doing; in other words, a strategy of “simple organisations and complex jobs”.
Effectively, the latter response follows a long-established design approach known as
sociotechnical systems design (STSD), mentioned above (Wastell, 2011). Several key
principles characterise the approach. First, that organisations should be seen as open
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systems, comprising (for analytic purposes) two sub-systems, the ‘technical’
(technology, skills and processes) and the ‘social’ (motivation, job satisfaction,
organisational and group culture). STSD seeks “Joint Optimisation” of these subsystems, i.e. the search for a mutually-reinforcing balance between what workers need
and want, and the technical requirements for effective performance. Other principles
include: Minimum Critical Specification (no more should be specified than is absolutely
essential) and the Sociotechnical Criterion (responsibility for dealing with contingencies
to be given to workers, not supervisors or managers). Put simply, do not over-specify,
delegate as much as safety and accountability will allow, liberating people to innovate
and adapt to unpredictable situations’.
The success of the “simple organisations, complex jobs” approach is attested in the
vignette of Mutual Benefit Life, a US insurance company (Hammer, 1990). Its old
process was bureaucratic and labyrinthine: insurance applications could go through 30
discrete steps, spanning five departments, taking up to 25 days. A new approach was
needed: departmental boundaries were swept away and a new position created, the case
manager:
Case managers have total responsibility for an application from the time it is
received to the time a policy is issued. Unlike clerks, who performed a fixed task
repeatedly under the watchful gaze of a supervisor, case managers work
autonomously. No more handoffs of files and responsibility (ibid., p.106).
This is the epitome of STSD: complex jobs and simple organisation. As a result
applications were processed in four hours with case managers handling twice the
volume of work. There are examples of such redesign within social work, such as the
Borough of Hackney’s “Reclaiming Social Work” initiative. Here the “process
paradigm” was seen as part of the problem, not the solution: “With greater reliance on a
procedural approach … a workforce often incapable of professional, creative and
independent thinking had emerged (Goodman and Trowler, 2011, p. 161). Radical reorganization along sociotechnical principles (small, autonomous work-groups) achieved
the virtuous circle of improved outcomes (e.g. reduced children in care) at a lower
financial cost (ibid; Munro, 2011).
We have argued that the change programme in Ireland is uniquely placed to take
account of what has happened in England. Services must be properly designed with full
account of both ends of the quality broom. The developments in England, and the shape
of those planned in Ireland, privilege the management of institutional risk over the
improvement of practice. Instead, we urge that future developments need to attend to
the role of ‘trust’ in the delivery of human services. Smith (2001) makes an important
distinction between trust and confidence. Confidence refers to the general sense of
safety and reliability that we invest in systems - having certain expectations in relation
to professional roles and the regulatory frameworks governing these systems. Thus, for
child care services, confidence would refer to the qualifications of those working in the
system, expectations about their role and expectations about the frameworks which
regulate and inspect what they do. Clearly, events in Ireland in recent years have led to
concern about the reliability of the systems at a number of levels. For example, it is
difficult to have confidence when crucial information about children and young people
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seems not to have been collected in a systematic way. Confidence is at the ‘hard’,
handle end of the quality broom, and can be supported by good systems.
However, this must not be at the expense of trust which serves as a guide to
interpersonal relationships where the outcome cannot be guaranteed and, indeed, where
the possibilities of disappointment and regret are always present – the ‘soft’ end of the
quality broom. If activities such as social work are to bring about positive outcomes in
people’s lives, then trust is essential. First, many of those who need services will have
experienced situations where their trust was betrayed very profoundly. This might lead
to the conclusion that it is better to concentrate on developing systems based upon rights
and entitlements. Rights are a vital underpinning for children’s services, but rights are
exercised in inter-personal encounters and services (including those based upon rights)
mediated by people (Smith, 2001). Research evidence suggests that how a service is
delivered really matters in terms of whether people continue to access it. For example,
young people constantly give feedback on the importance of how they are talked to by
workers and whether they feel such workers are genuine. Thus, whilst it is important to
measure how many children attend the meetings that are held to discuss their care, it is
just as important, if not more so, to devise meaningful measures that assess their level of
participation and how they feel about the quality of those meetings.
In order for risk to be assessed and change to happen, service users need to tell the truth
(Smith, 2001). Whilst this may not always be possible, it is even more unlikely to
happen if social workers are not able to build up relationships that are compassionate
and truthful in return. Service users value and respond to those who are honest and can
deliver the bad, as well as the good news, in a respectful manner. Integral to the
building of relationships is that workers have enough time to assess what is happening,
to mull over differing versions of events, to weigh up conflicting sets of evidence and to
elicit truthful accounts. This kind of work cannot be done by harried workers running
from one case to another without the space to think. Good quality supervision is also
necessary as the research on human cognition, explored above, suggests we are all
prone to cognitive error, particularly when we are tired and emotionally overwhelmed.
Supervision should offer a space to challenge judgements made and to process the
emotions that will arise when dealing with painful and distressing situations.
Trust and confidence are related but not the same, and systems that focus only upon
confidence building can destroy the possibilities for developing the kind of trusting
relationships we have described above (Featherstone, Coogan and Landy, 2010). We
would argue that Ireland should grasp the opportunity to embrace principles of system
design which aim at building trust and supporting the front-line professional task,
guarding against the seductive proxies for quality that timescales and targets produce.
These create new arenas for blame and tend to spawn more of themselves in response.
There is another way, and in this article we have outlined some of the ideas that are
emerging as alternative principles. We hope it contributes to the policy dialogues that
are necessary to ensure confidence and trust in the systems developed in both countries.
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